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ABSTRACT 
 
In New Zealand, Edward Snowden’s revelations about the extraordinary 
scope of the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) surveillance capabilities and 
the facilitating role of the Five Eyes alliance converged with increasing public 
concerns about the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) 
Amendment and Related Legislation Bill in 2013. This generated an intense 
and sustained debate in the country about surveillance policy. It was a debate 
in which the Prime Minister John Key has featured prominently. While 
apparently unable to clearly refute Snowden’s claims concerning mass 
surveillance in New Zealand, John Key’s vigorous public interventions helped 
counter the short-term political and diplomatic fallout.  However, the long-
term impact of public concerns over the surveillance policies of the Key 
government may be much harder to predict in what is an intimate democracy, 
and the prospect of substantial political blowback cannot be ruled out. 
 
 
 
The Snowden revelations has coincided with growing public disquiet in New Zealand 
about the role of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), an 
agency responsible for foreign signals intelligence collection and counter-intelligence 
operations. This disquiet had notably increased in May 2013 after the John Key 
government announced it would introduce the GCSB Amendment and Related 
Legislation Bill (hereafter the GCSB Amendment Bill), a measure which proposed to 
significantly extend the powers of the GCSB to collect information on New 
Zealanders for the use of other government departments including the New Zealand 
Police, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and the New Zealand Special 
Intelligence Service (NZSIS).  
This article seeks to evaluate, in a systematic fashion, the public impact of the 
Snowden revelations on national security and surveillance policy in New Zealand.  In 
 2 
the first part of the article, we consider New Zealand’s intelligence community, its 
international connections and describe how two developments – the GCSB 
Amendment Bill and the Snowden leaks – have caused public consternation over 
surveillance policy in New Zealand. In the second section, a conceptual model 
developed by Michelle Hale Williams is outlined to help define, understand and 
measure the impact factor in public life. In the third section of the essay, we utilize the 
Williams’ framework, in a bottom up fashion, to examine the impact of Snowden on 
public and political debate in New Zealand, including the role of the media.  
The fourth part of the article looks at the effect of Snowden’s leaks on the 
institutional environment within New Zealand. The fifth section explores the impact 
of Snowden’s revelations on New Zealand government’s policy-making during this 
period. The sixth and final section provides an overall assessment and concludes that 
in the short-term, at least, the substantial impact of the Snowden revelations on public 
debate in New Zealand did not translate into significant changes to government policy 
in the national security area. However, it is argued that the long-term prognosis for 
government policy in contested, complex areas like surveillance policy in an intimate 
democracy like New Zealand may well prove to be quite different. 
 
National Security and the New Zealand Intelligence Community  
 
The post 9/11 - era has witnessed a significant expansion of American resources 
devoted to intelligence gathering.  However, the extent of this trend was not fully 
apparent until a former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, surfaced in Hong Kong in 
May 2013 with thousands of highly classified intelligence documents in his 
possession.  Starting on 5 June 2013, Mr Snowden began to leak documents to the 
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public through selected media outlets and has continued to do so ever since.  
According to Daniel Ellsberg, ‘there has not been in American history a more 
important leak than Edward Snowden’s release of NSA material—and that definitely 
includes the Pentagon Papers 40 years ago’. 1   Through the release of classified 
documents, it was revealed that the NSA has gathered two types of information – 
metadata, which can be defined as the footprint of electronic device use,2 and content 
data.  Signals intercept programs like PRISM and X-KEYSCORE have radically 
improved the surveillance capabilities of the NSA and enabled the United States (US) 
government to collect personal data on a massive scale.3  
Snowden’s disclosures have had ramifications for New Zealand. Compared to 
many Western countries, New Zealand has a relatively small and centralized 
intelligence community. 4  Key agencies include the NZSIS, the GCSB and the 
National Assessments Bureau (NAB).5  The NZSIS is responsible for advising the 
government on matters relating to New Zealand’s national security interests.  While 
the NZSIS focuses mainly on domestic security intelligence, it also has a role in 
collecting foreign intelligence. The NZSIS budget for 2012-13 was around NZ$37.5 
million.6  The GCSB has a dual function in foreign signals intelligence collection and 
counter-intelligence operations.  This agency has two communication interception 
                                                        
1 Daniel Ellsberg, ‘Edward Snowden: saving us from the United Stasi of America’, The Guardian, 10 
June 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/10/edward-snowden-united-stasi-
america (accessed 01 November 2014). 
2 Ben Grubb and James Massola, ‘What is ‘metadata’ and should you worry if yours is stored by law?’  
The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-
news/what-is-metadata-and-should-you-worry-if-yours-is-stored-by-law-20140806-100zae.html 
(accessed 01 November 2014). 
3 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 2014) p.153; Paul Buchanan, ‘Snowden Leaks sure to catch NZ out’, The New 
Zealand Herald, 3 December 2013, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11165857 (accessed 15 October 
2014).  
4 Jim Rolfe, ‘New Zealand: Small Community, Central Control’ in Daniel Baldino (eds.) Democratic 
Oversight of Intelligence Services (Annandale: The Federation Press, 2010) p.109. 
5 Ibid., pp.109-110. 
6 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2013 
(New Zealand Government, Wellington) p.31, http://www.security.govt.nz/assets/media/annual-
reports/nzsis-ar13.pdf (accessed 01 November 2014). 
 4 
stations: the high frequency radio interception station at Tangimoana, near Palmerston 
North, and the satellite communications interception station at Waihopai, near 
Blenheim.  The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has been located with the 
GCSB since its establishment in 2011.  In 2012-2013, the GCSB budget was reported 
to be NZ$67.9 million. 7   The NAB is responsible for collecting and interpreting 
information on external concerns and developments.  Located in the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), NAB provides analysis and assessment, 
based on public and intelligence sources, to inform government decision-making, but 
it does not provide policy advice.  NAB has a budget of approximately NZ$3.5 
million.8  
New Zealand’s intelligence services are supervised and directed by the Office of 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on Intelligence and 
Security (CSSIS). Accountability and oversight of the intelligence community 
involves both parliamentary and official bodies in New Zealand’s Westminster style 
political system. In 1996, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament was 
given the task of reviewing the activities of the NZSIS and the GCSB.  The five-
strong committee consists of the Prime Minister as Chair, the Leader of the 
Opposition, two members nominated by the Prime Minister and one member 
nominated by the Leader of the Opposition in consultation with all parties in 
Parliament.9  Some oversight is also provided by three other entities.10   
                                                        
7 Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 
2013 (New Zealand Government, Wellington) p.29, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Annual-
Reports/GCSB-Annual-Report-2013.pdf (accessed 01 November 2014). 
8 New Zealand Intelligence Community, ‘National Assessment Bureau (NAB)’ 
http://www.nzic.govt.nz/about-us/nab/ (accessed 01 November 2014). 
9 Rolfe, ‘New Zealand: Small Community, Central Control’, pp.113-114. 
10 First, the Commissioner of Security Warrants is an office established in 1999.  Appointed by the 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the Commissioner’s role is to advise 
the Prime Minister (the Minister in charge of the NZSIS and GCSB) on domestic interception warrants 
and to issue them jointly with the Prime Minister. Second, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) is responsible for reviewing any matter relating to the NZSIS or GCSB where New 
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New Zealand’s Participation in the Five Eyes Intelligence Agreement 
 
The publication of leaked documents by Snowden has shone the spotlight on a little 
known global surveillance apparatus known as ‘Five Eyes’ run by the United States’ 
NSA in close cooperation with partner intelligence agencies in Australia, Canada, 
United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand.11 In particular, the Snowden revelations 
have highlighted the close links and coordination between the GCSB and the NSA 
organization. Historically, cooperation in signals intelligence between the Five Eyes 
countries officially began in the early stages of the Cold War, prompted by the 
perceived threat of the Soviet Union. The Five Eyes states developed what was called 
ECHELON, a surveillance network to monitor the military and diplomatic 
communications of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies.12  
By the end of the 20th century, following the demise of the Cold War and 
deepening globalization, the ECHELON surveillance network had evolved into a 
global system capable of intercepting massive amounts of private communications, 
including telephone calls, fax, email and other data traffic.13  The NSA designed the 
ECHELON system to interconnect the process of collecting information within the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Zealand citizens have been or may have adversely affected or New Zealand laws contravened.  
Established in 1996, the IGIS is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister.  The IGIS is required to have previously held office as a judge of the High Court of 
New Zealand. Third, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is statutorily independent and holds an 
oversight function in relation to the intelligence community.  Amongst other things, the Commissioner 
investigates complaints that personal information has been accessed or treated by intelligence agencies 
(most generally the NZSIS) in ways that were not consistent with the 1993 Privacy Act. See Rolfe, 
‘New Zealand: Small Community, Central Control’, pp.114-115. 
11 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Boundless Informant: the NSA’s secret tool to track global 
surveillance data’, The Guardian, 8 June 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-
boundless-informant-global-datamining (accessed 03 November 2014). 
12 ‘What you need to know about Echelon’, BBC News, 29 May 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/1357513.stm (accessed 03 November 2014). 
13 Gerhard Schmid, ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and 
commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) 2001/2098(INI)’, European Parliament 
Session Document, 11 July 2001, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 14 May 2015). 
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Five Eyes alliance. 14  This means, for example, that considerable amounts of the 
intelligence collected by the GCSB is not screened in New Zealand, but sent directly 
to the headquarters of the agency concerned. 15   Consequently, the GCSB, the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK, the Communications 
Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), and the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) 
are component parts of what is an integrated NSA led - international intelligence 
operation.16   
Thus, New Zealand has had a long history of participating in the Five Eyes 
alliance.  Successive elected governments in Wellington have continued to support 
New Zealand’s participation in this arrangement. Presumably, New Zealand 
governments have believed they gain far more information on which to base their own 
decisions than would otherwise be available. New Zealand’s involvement in the Five 
Eyes alliance did not prevent the adoption of a non-nuclear security policy in the mid-
1980s.  At the same time, New Zealand felt free to oppose the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. Rather than eroding New Zealand’s sovereignty, participation in the Five 
Eyes partnership has been seen by decision-makers as enhancing the country’s 
capacity to conduct an independent foreign policy. 
 
The Course of Events: The GCSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden Leaks 
 
A triggering event for public concerns about surveillance policy in New Zealand was 
the arrest of Mr Kim Dotcom, founder of the ‘Mega Upload’ file-sharing website, and 
three business associates on 20 January 2012.  Dotcom’s arrest occurred during a 
                                                        
14 Nicky Hager, ‘Exposing the Global Surveillance System’, Covert Action Quarterly (Winter 
1996/1997). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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high-profile armed raid on his home, which involved 76 officers and two 
helicopters. 17   Two weeks earlier, on 5 January 2012, indictments were filed in 
Virginia, USA, against Dotcom and some other ‘Mega Upload’ executives involving 
alleged crimes relating to online piracy, including racketeering, conspiring to commit 
copyright infringement, and conspiring to commit money laundering.18  The raid on 
Dotcom’s home involved the New Zealand Police and the United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
In the legal case that followed, it was revealed that ‘warrants used in the raid 
were illegal because they were used to seize material that was irrelevant to the 
investigation, that the FBI had illegally copied the contents of computer hard drives 
seized in the raid, and that the GCSB had unlawfully spied on Dotcom prior to the 
raid, supplying information to the police relating to his movements and personal 
communications’.19  Since Dotcom was granted New Zealand residency in 2010, he 
was legally entitled to protection from GCSB surveillance under the terms of the 
GCSB Act’s statutory framework.  As a consequence of the GCSB’s illegal spying 
activity, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key commissioned Cabinet Secretary 
Rebecca Kitteridge to carry out a review of compliance systems and processes at the 
GCSB in March 2013,20 which culminated in the release of the Kitteridge Report.  
The report found that there were ‘underlying problems within GCSB, concerning 
                                                        
17 ‘Editorial: Kim Dotcom sets off year of fireworks for politicians’, The New Zealand Herald, 27 
December 2012, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10856144 
(accessed 03 November 2014). 
18 The United States Department of Justice, ‘Justice Department Charges Leaders of Megaupload with 
Widespread Online Copyright Infringement’, Office of Public Affairs, 19 January 2012, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-charges-leaders-megaupload-widespread-online-
copyright-infringement (accessed 03 November 2014). 
19 Joe Burton, ‘Small States and Cyber Security: The Case of New Zealand’, Political Science 65/2 
(2013) p.232. 
20 John Roughan, John Key: Portrait of a Prime Minister (London: Penguin, 2014).  
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GCSB’s structure, management of its information, capability and capacity’.21  The 
report revealed 55 cases of unlawful GCSB surveillance over nine years, involving 88 
New Zealand residents and permanent residents.22  The report also recommended that 
external oversight of the GCSB be strengthened.23   
Prime Minister John Key acknowledged ‘this review will knock public 
confidence in the GCSB’, but he said one of the central findings of the Kitteridge 
Report concerned the inadequacy of the GCSB Act 2003.  Mr Key stated ‘the act 
governing the GCSB is not fit for purpose and probably never has been’.24  As a 
response to the Kitteridge Report, John Key announced on 8 May 2013 the GCSB 
Amendment Bill, which would extend the powers of the GCSB to collect information 
on New Zealanders for the use of other government departments including the New 
Zealand Police, NZDF and the NZSIS.25  According to this Bill, the GCSB would 
have three main functions.  First, the GCSB would continue to collect foreign 
intelligence, but under the new legislation it could conduct surveillance on New 
Zealand citizens or permanent residents in prescribed circumstances with a warrant.26  
Second, it would give the GCSB a legal mandate to assist the police, the NZDF and 
NZSIS with their work and therefore expanded the operational range of the 
organization.  Third, the legislation would extend the GCSB’s cyber-security role to 
include protecting private-sector cyber systems,27 a development that had the potential 
                                                        
21 Rebecca Kitteridge, ‘Review of Compliance at the Government Communications Security Bureau’, 
March 2013, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Compliance-Review/Review-of-Compliance.pdf     
(accessed 07 October 2014) p.6. 
22 Ibid., p.18. 
23 Ibid., p.6. 
24 Imogen Crispe and Thomas Mead, ‘The GCSB Report: an in depth look’, 3 News, 9 April 2013, 
http://www.3news.co.nz/politics/the-gcsb-report-an-in-depth-look-2013040918 (15 November 2014). 
25 New Zealand Parliament, ‘Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation 
Amendment Bill’, 20 August 2013, http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/legislation/bills/00DBHOH_BILL12122_1/government-communications-security-bureau-and-
related-legislation (accessed 27 November 2014). 
26 Valerie Redmond, ‘I spy with my not so little eye: A comparison of surveillance law in the United 
States and New Zealand’, Fordham International Law Review 37/3 (2014) p.759. 
27 Audrey Young, ‘GCSB bill passes after final reading’, The New Zealand Herald, 21 August 2013, 
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to significantly increase the government’s ability to monitor the Internet in relation to 
New Zealand.  At the same time, the GCSB under the changes was still able to 
provide and receive information from other intelligence agencies within ECHELON.28  
This arrangement created a potential loophole in surveillance law whereby the New 
Zealand government could circumvent its own laws by sharing information on its own 
citizens with other countries.29  
Shortly after the release of the Kitteridge Report, Edward Snowden began to 
release a series of highly classified intelligence documents relating to global 
surveillance.  The steady and cumulative impact of the continuing Snowden 
revelations has intensified public concerns in New Zealand about spying. Amongst 
other things, Snowden, his close collaborator, Glen Greenwald, an American 
journalist and Nicky Hager, a New Zealand journalist, have alleged the GCSB directly 
supplies the NSA with data derived from ‘full-take’ surveillance of ‘a surprising array 
of New Zealand’s friends, trading partners and close Pacific neighbors’30; that New 
Zealand had been spying on democracies for economic advantage, such as the 
Brazilian energy company PetroBras31 and had used the GCSB in a unsuccessful bid 
to help New Zealand Trade Minister, Tim Groser, become Director of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 201332; and that the GCSB has been involved in the 
domestic mass surveillance of New Zealanders. According to Snowden, the GCSB ‘is 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11112152 (accessed 27 October 
2014). 
28 Redmond, ‘I spy with my not so little eye,’ p.768. 
29 Ibid., p.769. 
30 Nicky Hager and Ryan Gallagher, ‘Snowden Revelations/The Price of the Five Eyes Club: Mass 
spying on friendly nations’, The New Zealand Herald, 05 March 2015, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411759 (accessed 15 March 
2015). 
31 Michael Botur, ‘The GCSB does not conduct mass surveillance on Kiwis – Key’, The New Zealand 
Herald, 14 September 2014, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11324452 (accessed 27 October 
2014). 
32 Tova O’Brien, ‘GCSB claims detract from South Korea free trade deal’, 3 News, 23 March 2015, 
http://www.3news.co.nz/nznews/gcsb-claims-overshadow-south-korean-free-trade-deal-2015032322 
(accessed 25 March 2015). 
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directly involved in the untargeted, bulk interception and algorithmic analysis of 
private communications sent via internet, satellite, radio, and phone networks’.33  
While the Key government vehemently denied such claims, Snowden countered 
by saying that ‘any statement that mass surveillance is not performed in New Zealand, 
or that the internet communications are not comprehensively intercepted and 
monitored, or that this is not intentionally and actively abetted by the GCSB, is 
categorically false.  If you live in New Zealand, you are being watched’. 34 
Furthermore, Greenwald claimed that the GCSB Amendment Act was designed to 
enable mass metadata collection, rather than prevent it.35 In other words, Greenwald 
contended the ‘New Zealand’s government’s position privately was the exact opposite 
of what they were saying publicly’.36  
 
Conceptualizing Public Impact: The Williams’ Model  
For the purpose of this study, the concept of impact is broadly defined in terms of 
influence.37  According to this definition, influence ‘is the capacity to change a course 
of events that might develop differently without the introduction of the impact 
stimulus…influence determines the ability to alter political discourse, to introduce 
important issues, to develop fresh ideas, and to induce action’.38  In order to help 
                                                        
33 Edward Snowden, ‘Snowden: New Zealand’s Prime Minister isn’t telling the truth about mass 
surveillance’, The Intercept, 15 September 2014, 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/ (accessed 04 October 
2014). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Tim Hume, ‘Snowden, Assange, Greenwald, Dotcom: Can this gang of four take down a PM?’ CNN 
News, 15 September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/15/world/asia/new-zealand-dotcom-
snowden-key/ (accessed 04 October 2014). 
36 Glenn Greenwald, Transcript of ‘The Moment of Truth’, Auckland Town Hall, New Zealand, 
Streamed Live on September 15 2014, 
http://ia902304.us.archive.org/13/items/TranscriptMomentOfTruthAucklandNZ20140915GreenwaldSn
owdenAssangeAmsterdam/Transcript_MomentOfTruth-AucklandNZ_2014-09-15_Greenwald-
Snowden-Assange-Amsterdam.pdf (accessed 04 October 2014) p.16. 
37 The criteria used here for defining and measuring impact were derived from Michelle Hale Williams, 
The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) pp.43-46. 
38 Ibid., p.42. 
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measure the effects of the Snowden revelations in New Zealand, the authors draw on 
a model that identifies impact at three different levels: agendas, institutions and 
policy.39  For Williams, ‘one must account for the opportunity to influence decision-
making prior to the stage of formal legislation’.40  According to this view, the ‘critical 
stage’ of influence is found in ‘political debates, popular discourse, or the process of 
bringing an issue to saliency’.41  A pyramid model has been used to represent the 
different possibilities for impact (see Figure 1).  The bottom level represents the 
widest possibilities for impact, and the second and third levels represent narrower and 
more concrete possibilities for impact respectively.   
The agenda level emphasizes the degree of influence that events have on popular 
discourse, public attention, and society at large.  Williams’ agenda level is consistent 
with the works of Mark Considine,42 John Kingdon,43 Frank Baumgartner and Bryan 
Jones.44  From this literature, Williams derives an understanding of ‘agenda’ as ‘the 
cycle of new ideas about policy replacing the old ideas’.45  Williams draws on the 
work of Considine, who believes that ‘one of the most important aspects of 
policymaking in any political system is the pre-decision stage at which a potentially 
wide range of concerns and preferences are fashioned into some actionable list of 
proposals’.46  This pre-decision level includes the ‘informal political discourse in a 
society and the way actors in the political system respond’. 47  Interaction at the 
agendas level is a dynamic process.  This is according to the work of Kingdon, where 
‘problems, policies, and opportunities combine and interact with the political 
                                                        
39 Ibid., p.43-46. 
40 Ibid., p.43. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Mark Considine, ‘Making up the Government’s Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System’, 
Governance 11/3 (1998) pp.297-317. 
43 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1984). 
44 Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
45 Williams, The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties, p.44. 
46 Considine, ‘Making up the Government’s Mind’, p.297. 
47 Williams, The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties, p.44. 
 12 
environment’. 48   For Williams, ‘political agenda-setting incorporates a variety of 
actors outside of the legislature including political parties, interest groups, social 
movements and the priorities of the general public or voters that all combine to affect 
agendas’.49 
The institutional level is concerned with the impact of events on the political 
system, or the ‘institutional structure of government’.50  This is a narrower level of 
impact that affects the constitutional form of government, political party ideologies, 
party-to-party relationships, and electoral dynamics.  At the institutional level, as with 
the agendas level, Williams believes there is a dynamic relationship, where political 
parties can alter the political system.51  According to this view, political structures can 
change in response to the impact of an event stimulus.  This is because electoral 
politics ‘presents a zero-sum dilemma’, where votes are largely obtained at the 
expense of other parties.52  An impact stimulus may force parties to shift along the 
ideological spectrum, or to expand into new areas in order to appeal to voter’s 
demands.  In rare cases, ‘electoral system rules may change or constitutions may be 
revised’.53     
 
                                                        
48 Ibid., p.44. 
49 Ibid., p.44. 
50 Ibid., p.45. 
51 Ibid., p.45. 
52 Ibid., p.45. 
53 Ibid., p.45. 
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                                          Figure 1 Levels of Impact  
 
In the top-tier of Williams’ pyramid, the policy-making level of impact is evident. 
Here the formulation and implementation of legislation could be seen as a ‘concrete’ 
indicator of impact.  This level represents the most visible expression of influence 
because legislative activities are relatively easy to document.54  However, the policy 
level also represents ‘the most difficult causal leap’. 55  This is because ‘any issue has 
multiple influences upon its legislative form and outcome’.56    
 
Impact of the Surveillance Controversy at the Agendas level  
 
According to the social agendas level of the Williams’ model, an impact stimulus can 
affect public opinion, political discourse and the role of the media.  Within New 
Zealand, a spirited debate on surveillance emerged after proposed changes to the 
GCSB Act in 2013.   
 
 
                                                        
54 Ibid., p.46. 
55 Ibid., p.46. 
56 Ibid., p.46. 
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Public Debate on Surveillance: Phase One 
 
The Amendment Bill was said to be a response to a review of compliance systems and 
processes at the GCSB. Arguing that the 2003 Act governing the GCSB was 
inadequate, Prime Minister Key announced his intention to introduce an Amendment 
Bill, which would extend the powers of the GCSB to collect information on New 
Zealanders. 
In Parliament, the Bill encountered fierce opposition. Grant Robertson, the then 
Deputy Labour Leader, observed: 
New Zealanders have lost their faith in the intelligence and security agencies 
of this country, and I believe that that is a direct result of the way that the 
Prime Minister has undertaken his duties as the person whom we as New 
Zealanders have, on our behalf, in charge of those agencies.  He has got that 
oversight and he is not performing properly.  New Zealanders are worried 
about their privacy, they are worried about whether their details are available 
to Governments overseas, and this Government wants to ram legislation 
through this committee in a way that I do not believe many New Zealanders 
would accept.  We need better oversight of our intelligence agencies.57 
 
Phil Goff, former Labour Leader, did not believe that the GCSB Amendment Bill 
addressed the shortcomings identified in the GCSB review and said a Labour-led 
government would conduct an inquiry into New Zealand’s intelligence services: 
We needed an inquiry because this legislation and its associated bill came 
about because of abuse of power by the GCSB.  They came about because 
there are not sufficient safeguards on how the GCSB exercises its authority.  In 
our fraternal parliaments in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, they 
do not put the Minister in charge of the agency on the committee that oversees 
that.  They keep Ministers off.  But we have our Prime Minister chairing the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, setting the agenda, and very rarely 
calling it together and we call that a safeguard against the abuse of powers of 
the GCSB.58 
 
                                                        
57 New Zealand Parliament Hansard Debates, ‘Intelligence and Security Committee – Membership’, 13 
June 2013, Volume 691, p.11134, http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/debates/debates/50HansD_20130613_00000020/intelligence-and-security-committee-
%E2%80%94-membership (accessed 10 December 2014). 
58 Ibid. 
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However, John Key, the Prime Minister and the Minister responsible for the 
GCSB and NZSIS, insisted that the 2013 GCSB Bill was not ‘a revolution in the way 
New Zealand conducts its intelligence operations’ and said if he could disclose some 
of the briefings he had received about security risks to New Zealand, it would ‘cut 
dead’59 some of the opposition to the legislation: 
I have access to evidence that shows that without the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and the SIS, our national security 
would be vulnerable.  There are threats our Government needs to protect New 
Zealanders from. Those threats are real and ever-present and we underestimate 
them at our peril.60 
 
Mr Key added that others ‘may play politics with the security and lives of New 
Zealanders, but I cannot and I do not and I will not’.61  The Prime Minister maintained 
the new legislation would ‘put in place a stronger oversight regime that will go some 
way to rebuilding public confidence in the GCSB’.62  He also claimed that the GCSB 
Amendment Bill ‘actually tightens, not widens, the existing regime’.63  The GCSB 
Amendment Bill was passed into law at its third reading by a vote of 61 to 59, a 
margin of just two votes. 
Outside Parliament, the GCSB Amendment Bill was the subject of major public 
concern.  It was widely feared that the legislation effectively allowed the GCSB to 
engage in wholesale spying on New Zealanders.64  One opinion poll taken after the 
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passing of the legislation found 75 per cent of respondents were concerned about the 
changes.65  Another opinion poll conducted by TV3, and cited by Labour MP Phil 
Goff in Parliament, found that 40 per cent of New Zealanders did not have trust and 
confidence in the GCSB.66  Shortly before the passage of the legislation, opponents of 
the GCSB Amendment Bill on 27 July 2013 staged nationwide protests in eleven 
major towns and cities.67  There were also a substantial number of critical as well as 
supportive media editorials on the GCSB legislation.68 
Amongst other things, the media highlighted the issue of the GCSB’s access to 
‘metadata’, which includes the duration and time of calls between numbers, sender 
and recipient of emails, time of emails and the location of information.69  Protection 
under the GCSB Amendment Act is only extended to private communications and 
does not extend to metadata or to conversations that could ‘reasonably’ be expected to 
be intercepted. 70   This is despite the fact that metadata encompasses personal 
information and can build a more detailed profile than listening in to actual content.71  
Concerns have also been raised regarding the term ‘private communication’ in the 
GCSB Amendment Act.  Under the Act, a communication can only be ‘private’, and 
therefore protected from interception, if one of the parties has a ‘reasonable 
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expectation’ that their communication will not be intercepted. 72   A ‘reasonable 
expectation’ in this context is not about privacy in the wider meaning of the term or 
loss of privacy.73  Defining the term in the GCSB Amendment Act requires a much 
narrower and focused enquiry as to whether the communication will be intercepted.  It 
is irrelevant whether the interception occurs overseas or within New Zealand.74  As 
such, some commentators argue that warrantless surveillance of New Zealanders by 
the GCSB is entirely possible.75 
 
Public Debate on Surveillance: Phase Two 
 
The timing of the Snowden revelations, coming one month after proposed changes to 
the GCSB Act, deepened the debate concerning the surveillance capabilities of the 
New Zealand intelligence service.  David Shearer, the then Leader of the Labour 
opposition party, said the Key Government had missed a major political opportunity 
to make effective changes to the intelligence community: 
The revelations of Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden have created global 
disquiet… We could have seized the chance to thoroughly investigate how our 
intelligence sector works in an increasingly global environment.76 
 
Dr Russel Norman, the Co-Leader of the opposition Green Party, raised questions 
about the national accountability of the GCSB: 
What we discovered from the Snowden revelations is that the GCSB, which is 
presumably the agency, is providing vast amounts of data to the National 
Security Agency.  In the information that has been revealed by Snowden, we 
now know that New Zealand is one of the sources of all the data that is 
provided to the National Security Agency about internet traffic, phone traffic, 
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and all the rest of it, and presumably the GCSB is providing that information, 
which largely comes out of Waihopai, to that agency.77 
 
Several academics entered the national discussion on surveillance.  According to 
Kevin Clements, the question facing all New Zealanders after the Snowden 
revelations is ‘Who guards the guards?’  In his view, the global war on terror had 
dramatically expanded state power while simultaneously eroding individual liberties 
and it was appropriate, therefore, that New Zealand should now ‘have a Commission 
of inquiry to re-evaluate the value of the Five Eyes security arrangement and ask 
whether New Zealand’s foreign policy is enhanced or diminished by it’.78 The impact 
of Snowden’s revelations on individual civil liberties was also a source of concern to 
Greg Dawes in at least two ways.  First, while the NSA only claims to be collecting 
data on non-Americans, that ‘includes most of us, since almost all our online data at 
some point passes through servers in the United States’.79  Second, the British GCHQ 
‘has already been receiving information from the American spy programme.  So it is 
likely our government has been doing the same’.80 
Newspaper editorials in New Zealand responded in a largely critical fashion to the 
ramifications of the Snowden leaks.  The Dominion Post observed: 
Serious questions remain and Key has failed to answer them.  Snowden is not 
a traitor, as former Government Communications Security Bureau head Bruce 
Ferguson claims.  In fact, he is a hero of democracy, who, at his own peril, 
revealed a staggering worldwide bugging machine that clearly threatens our 
liberties.81 
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An editorial in the Otago Daily Times struck an equally robust line: 
 
New Zealanders need to be reassured they are not being monitored, except in 
the extreme cases where terrorist activity is suspected.  Casual monitoring of 
citizens in the hope of uncovering something of interest is reprehensible.82 
 
Meanwhile, an editorial in the Waikato Times had this to say about the meaning of the 
Snowden revelations: 
 
The public airing of details about Prism, a massive internet surveillance 
programme secretly operated by the United States Government, is in a 
different league…The NSA doubtless believes it does nothing wrong, either, 
when it covertly collects information on tens of millions of US citizens from 
their phone calls and emails and by tapping into Google, Facebook, Microsoft, 
and Apple…But evidence is mounting that the war on terrorism has become a 
pretext for the insidious broadening of government prying.83 
 
Despite such criticisms, Prime Minister Key said he had no concerns about 
Snowden’s revelations and that they would not challenge ‘the integrity of GCSB’.84  
He justified changes to the 2003 legislation by saying that some people in New 
Zealand were being trained by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization in such places as 
the Yemen.85  The reality, Key noted, is that ‘we [New Zealanders] live in a global 
environment where there are real threats’.86  And he contended it would be wrong to 
believe there are no New Zealanders with links to terrorist organizations. 87   Jim 
Veitch, an intelligence specialist, publicly supported the Prime Minister’s claim and 
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described the GCSB Amendment legislation as a logical response to radical changes 
in surveillance technology, claiming it was no longer possible to ‘distinguish between 
internal and external intelligence in the way that once was possible’.88 While the 
occasional newspaper editorial also supported the security justification for expanding 
GCSB,89 much of the media debate that took place over surveillance in New Zealand 
after Snowden seemed to be dominated by expressions of concern or opposition. 
However, Prime Minister Key insisted ‘most New Zealanders’ understood and 
accepted his government’s position on the GCSB Amendment Bill.  He condemned 
the vocal opposition to the legislation as coming from ‘experts who are not experts 
and really do not know what they are talking about’.90  Prime Minister Key was 
reported as describing the strong opposition of the New Zealand Law Society to the 
GCSB legislation as completely wrong.91  In a submission on the proposed Bill, the 
Law Society argued: ‘It seems that the underlying objective of the legislation is to 
give the GCSB powers it previously lacked: the power to conduct surveillance on 
New Zealand citizens and residents’. 92   The InternetNZ party also raised serious 
concerns about the GCSB Amendment bill claiming that its enhanced powers were 
too broad.  In its submission, InternetNZ said it supported the provisions of the Bill 
that addressed cyber security of New Zealand’s information infrastructure but 
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questioned whether such a function should be located within an intelligence agency.93  
But such concerns seemed to be given little serious consideration by the New Zealand 
government.  
In a much quoted comment at a National Party press conference on 10 August 
2013, Mr Key bluntly told journalist Rebecca Wright that New Zealanders care more 
about snapper quotas (for fishing) than the GCSB bill.94  In a subsequent interview, 
Prime Minister Key expanded on his assessment of public opinion in New Zealand by 
noting the government had received ‘124 submissions on the GCSB Bill and 30,000 
on snapper [fishing quotas]’.95  In other words, the New Zealand Prime Minister was 
saying that while the GCSB legislation and the Snowden revelations were making the 
headlines, those concerns were not shared by the wider public.  He also contended 
that ‘if people aren't doing something wrong, then it's very unlikely they would be 
falling within the [expanded] remit of the GCSB's activities’.96  He added there was 
considerable ‘confusion’ over the GCSB legislation and that the new changes to the 
agency did not amount to ‘mass surveillance’ of the country.97  The Prime Minister 
told the New Zealand Herald newspaper that both he and the Director of GCSB would 
resign if the intelligence agency was subsequently found to have conducted mass 
surveillance.98 
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Impact of the Surveillance Controversy at the Institutional Level  
 
According to the institutional level of Williams’ impact model, developments such as 
the GCSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden leaks can shape the political system, 
political party relationships and political party structures. Certainly, with a New 
Zealand general election in the offing in September 2014, certain political parties 
sought to react to signs of public disquiet over the surveillance issue. 
 
Kim Dotcom and ‘The Moment of Truth’ 
 
In March 2014, Kim Dotcom founded the Internet Party, a New Zealand political 
party which pledged to stop mass surveillance of New Zealanders by the 
government. 99   Kim Dotcom rose to prominence in New Zealand following his 
unauthorized surveillance by the GCSB prior to 2013.  One week prior to New 
Zealand’s general election, Dotcom’s Internet Party organized what it called ‘The 
Moment of Truth’, a live event to take place in Auckland’s Town Hall on 15 
September.  According to Dotcom, New Zealanders should ‘consider the fact that the 
nation has quietly morphed, under the leadership of Prime Minister John Key, into the 
political equivalent of an American slave, responding more readily to the interests that 
motivate the United States than to the concerns of the Kiwis’.100 In front of a packed 
audience, ‘The Moment of Truth’ included presentations by Laila Harré, leader of the 
Internet Party, lawyer Robert Amsterdam, Kim Dotcom, journalist Glenn Greenwald, 
Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, founder of Wikileaks, by live uplink.  The 
                                                        
99 Laura Walters, ‘Launch day for Kim Dotcom’s Internet Party,’ Stuff News, 27 March 2014, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/9873341/Launch-day-for-Kim-Dotcoms-Internet-Party 
(accessed 27 September 2014). 
100 Kim Dotcom, ‘Why New Zealand is a slave to US interests’, CNN News, 12 September 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/11/opinion/kim-dotcom-opinion/ (accessed 27 September 2014). 
 23 
event was perhaps indicative of the way ‘deep investigation of government security 
activity may be passing from formally constituted commissions and committees 
toward a version of global civil society, characterized by NGOs, civil rights lawyers, 
journalists and regional bodies such as the Council of Europe’.101 
In the build-up to ‘The Moment of Truth’ event on 15 September 2014, a harsh 
war of words developed between John Key and Glenn Greenwald.  The New Zealand 
Prime Minister quickly sought to discredit Glenn Greenwald and his stated intention 
to reveal evidence of domestic mass surveillance of New Zealanders by the GCSB.  
Mr Key repeatedly described Mr Greenwald as ‘Dotcom’s little henchman’, 102 
accused Greenwald of being on Dotcom’s payroll and doing ‘Dotcom’s bidding’,103 
called the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist ‘a loser’104 and ‘a clown’,105 and strongly 
implied that Greenwald’s visit to New Zealand just a week or so before the New 
Zealand general election was a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the 
election. 106   The Prime Minister added: ‘There is no mass surveillance of New 
Zealanders by the GCSB and there never has been. Mr Dotcom's little henchman will 
be proven to be incorrect because he is incorrect’.107  While Greenwald said he did not 
want ‘the prime minister’s unbelievably reckless accusations’108 to distract from the 
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substantive issues, he said he ‘would not be paid a single penny’109 for his work in 
New Zealand.  He also said the idea he had suddenly developed an ‘urgent desire to 
manipulate the outcome of New Zealand’s election is so frivolous that no one could 
really say it with a straight face’.110 
At the same time, Mr Greenwald’s arrival in New Zealand prompted Prime 
Minister Key to publicly acknowledge for the first time since the GCSB controversy 
had begun the existence of plans for a ‘cable access surveillance programme’.111  Key 
said the government had begun work on presenting a business case for the project, 
which he described as a ‘mass cyber security protection initiative’, 112  but he 
personally stopped the work in March 2013 because he thought it was a step too far.  
Key claimed that the project was replaced by a narrower initiative, described as a 
more limited version of mass cyber protection, with tailored functionality which an 
individual company or agency could deploy.113  Anthony Briscoe, Chief Executive of 
Southern Cross Cables, also released a statement saying there was ‘no facility by the 
NSA, the GCSB or anyone else on the Southern Cross cable network’.114   
But Greenwald argued the Prime Minister was misleading the New Zealand 
public.  The journalist maintained that documents provided by Edward Snowden 
would show that the GCSB has been involved in a mass surveillance programme 
code-named ‘Speargun’.115 The Prime Minister repeated his claims stating that ‘when 
it comes to New Zealanders, there is no mass surveillance’.116  Opposition leaders 
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such as the then Labour Party Leader, David Cunliffe, and Green Party Co-Leaders, 
Metiria Turei and Russel Norman, were quite measured in their public responses to 
Greenwald’s serious allegations. Both the Labour and Green parties pledged, if 
elected to government, to review the role of the GCSB,117 but also stated that they 
would not necessarily withdraw New Zealand from the Five Eyes arrangement if they 
formed a government.118 David Cunliffe maintained that ‘New Zealand gains more 
than it contributes’119 from the Five Eyes arrangement. 
In an extraordinary attempt to refute Greenwald’s claims of mass surveillance, 
Prime Minister Key indicated shortly before ‘The Moment of Truth’ event that he was 
prepared to declassify highly sensitive documents to prove that the GCSB pulled the 
plug on plans to spy on New Zealanders.120  However, the Prime Minister also stated 
that he would not the release the documents until after Greenwald tried to prove there 
was substance to his claims.121 
 
Mass Surveillance in New Zealand: Claims and Denials 
 
On 15 September, the day of ‘The Moment of Truth’ event, two articles were 
published on The Intercept. The first, written by Edward Snowden, unequivocally 
stated that New Zealanders were subject to mass surveillance. Snowden recalled that 
when he worked for the NSA he routinely came across communications of New 
Zealanders whilst working on ‘XKEYSCORE’, a surveillance tool the NSA shares 
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with the GCSB.  ‘XKEYSCORE’ allows total access to the database of 
communications collected in the course of mass surveillance and is used primarily for 
reading individual’s private correspondence.122   
Published alongside Snowden’s article in The Intercept was an article by Glenn 
Greenwald. He claimed that the New Zealand government secretly worked to use the 
enhanced powers of the August 2013 GCSB Amendment Act, passed in the wake of 
illegal domestic spying revelations, in order to initiate a new metadata collection 
program that appeared to have been designed to collect information about the 
communications of New Zealanders. 123   According to Greenwald, top secret 
documents obtained by Snowden showed that the GCSB, with on-going NSA 
cooperation, completed Phase I of a mass surveillance program, codenamed 
‘Speargun’, at some point in early 2013.124  This involved the covert installation of 
‘cable access’ equipment, which appeared to refer to surveillance of the Southern 
Cross cable, 125  a trans-Pacific telecommunications network that connects New 
Zealand to the rest of the world. Speargun then moved to Phase II, under which 
‘metadata probes’ were to be inserted into the Southern Cross cable, and that was 
scheduled for mid-2013.126 He also provided evidence of NSA planning documents, 
which show that completion of Speargun was awaiting the new GCSB Amendment 
Act.127  
Greenwald’s argument was apparently supported by the release of a document, in 
August 2014, which revealed an NSA engineer had visited New Zealand in February 
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2013 to discuss with GCSB officials how to intercept electronic traffic on the 
Southern Cross cable.128 New Zealand lawyer, Denis Tegg, found a reference to the 
engineer’s visit in NSA documents, stating that the engineer was in New Zealand for 
technical discussions regarding a future GCSB Special Source Operations (SSO) 
site.129  These SSO sites reportedly have the capacity to tap into countries’ fibre optic 
cables so that phone calls, internet and email use can be intercepted and monitored.  
According to Edward Snowden, the SSO is a division of the NSA.  An interception 
point on the Southern Cross cable would therefore mean that all of New Zealand’s 
international communications could be accessed.  It was further argued that such a 
major policy decision could only have been authorized by the Prime Minister, the 
Minister responsible for the NZSIS and GCSB. Notwithstanding these claims, John 
Key firmly denied that any such programme operated in New Zealand, or that there 
was any intention of introducing one.130  According to Green Party co-Leader, Dr 
Russel Norman, ‘data collection on this scale would represent a massive expansion in 
the capabilities of the GCSB and shows just how close the relationship is between 
New Zealand and US spy agencies’.131 
With the publication of the articles by Snowden and Greenwald, Prime Minister 
Key immediately declassified four documents, which he believed would confirm that 
the government had abandoned plans for a form of cyber protection, which could 
encroach on the privacy of New Zealand citizens.  These documents were previously 
classified ‘secret’ presumably for reasons of national well-being. The Prime Minister 
said there was no public interest in making the information available during the 
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intense debate over the GCSB Amendment Bill in 2013.132  However, he seemed to 
think the allegations of mass surveillance in New Zealand by the likes of Edward 
Snowden and Glenn Greenwald had completely changed the situation. According to 
Key, Snowden and Greenwald ‘are deliberately attempting to damage my reputation 
and tell New Zealanders that I’m doing something that I’m not and I’ve got no option 
but to protect myself’.133  Greenwald noted that Key ‘was not releasing…classified 
information for any other reason than protecting his reputation and for political 
gain’. 134  Certainly, Mr Key’s rapid decision to declassify and release secret 
documentation had the potential to ‘damage the security, defence, or international 
relations of New Zealand and/or friendly governments’.135  In the event, the released 
documents shed some light, but failed to decisively settle the question of whether 
New Zealanders were subject to mass surveillance. 
The documents confirmed the existence of a cyber-protection project called 
Cortex which had the limited objective of protecting government agencies and key 
infrastructure providers from cyber-attack.136  In 2011, the Key government decided 
to build a cyber-defence system following a series of external cyber-attacks on New 
Zealand institutions, starting in 2009.  A GCSB spokesperson subsequently sought to 
clarify the Cortex system by acknowledging that Speargun was a code that referred to 
                                                        
132 David Fisher, ‘Secret dangers of released GCSB documents’, The New Zealand Herald, 16 
September 2014: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11325743 
(accessed 27 September 2014). 
133 Ibid. 
134 Glen Greenwald cited in Toby Manhire, ‘Greenwald, Dotcom, Snowden and Assange take on 
‘adolescent’ John Key’, The Guardian, 15 September 2014: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/15/moment-truth-greenwald-dotcom-snowden-assange-
new-zealand-john-key (accessed 27 September 2014). 
135 Ibid. 
136 Fisher, ‘Secret dangers of released GCSB documents’. 
 29 
an early core component of the cyber defence project that was later jettisoned by 
Prime Minister Key.137  
But Snowden and Greenwald responded by saying that the Key government and 
GCSB were deliberately conflating cyber protection with a mass surveillance 
capability.  The four de-classified documents made no mention of the SPEARGUN 
capability, so it was unclear whether the abandoned element of CORTEX system was 
called SPEARGUN. At ‘The Moment of Truth’ event, Snowden stated ‘there are 
actually NSA facilities in New Zealand that the GCSB is aware of, and that means the 
Prime Minister is aware of, and one of them is in Auckland’. 138   According to 
Snowden, Prime Minister Key’s refusal to comment on XKEYSCORE was telling: 
‘What about the GCSB’s involvement in XKEYSCORE?  What about New Zealand’s 
involvement in the XKEYSCORE mass surveillance program?’139  Key claimed he 
could not comment as XKEYSCORE is related to foreign intelligence.  ‘But is it 
related to foreign intelligence’, Snowden argued, ‘if it’s collecting the 
communications of every man, woman and child in the country of New Zealand?’140  
Thus, Snowden claims that Key’s government’s denials about mass surveillance in 
New Zealand ‘is a careful parsing of words’. 141   As a member of Five Eyes 
intelligence sharing arrangement, Snowden maintains that the GCSB is cooperating 
closely with its senior partner NSA, and therefore the ‘NSA is doing it [mass 
surveillance] and then providing that same information to us [GCSB], so we don’t 
have to do it domestically’.142 
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Prime Minister John Key has denied that the NSA is operating in New Zealand, 
but he continued his refusal to comment on XKEYSCORE.143  However, a former 
Director of the GCSB, Bruce Ferguson, admitted its agents were trained in the use of 
data-harvesting technology.144  Mr Key’s office also declined to explain the process 
for making the CORTEX project documents available to the public, but said the Prime 
Minister was not concerned about any dangers arising from their declassification.   
 
Political Parameters of the Surveillance Controversy 
 
Despite the ‘Moment of Truth’ revelations, the Prime Minister’s reading of the public 
response to the surveillance debate, in the short term at least, proved to be astute. John 
Key apparently believed that an uncompromising approach to the complex 
surveillance question – given the strength of the economic record of his government 
and the absence of strong or political opposition from the Labour and Green parties on 
the surveillance issue – would persuade most New Zealanders to give his National-led 
government the benefit of the doubt.  His political judgment seemed vindicated.  On 
20 September 2014, Mr Key’s National Party won a third term with 47 per cent of the 
party vote.145  That gave it 60 seats in the 121 member Parliament and allowed the 
National Party to form a government under its leadership for a third successive term.  
Immediately after its re-election, the Key government emphasized that the 
terrorist threat presented to New Zealand by ISIS was very real and a number of New 
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Zealand citizens were either fighting for ISIS in Syria or were actively supporting this 
organization from New Zealand. The Key government also signalled that it expected 
an invitation to join the anti-ISIS coalition in the near future.146  In the meantime, the 
Prime Minister signalled his intention to make a major speech on national security 
and to take a more robust stance on security and intelligence issues, despite the 
controversies involving the GCSB and the Snowden revelations during his second 
term.147  
On balance, the GCSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden revelations did inspire 
some institutional changes in the political system. Kim Dotcom’s creation of the 
Internet Party was a direct response to claims of mass surveillance in New Zealand.  
The ‘Moment of Truth’, arranged by Dotcom with Snowden in attendance, was timed 
to have a significant impact on voter behaviour. However, other New Zealand 
opposition parties were much less willing to focus on the surveillance controversy, 
and ultimately the ‘Moment of Truth’ failed to have much immediate effect on New 
Zealand voters.  Indeed, the Internet Party experienced a humiliating electoral result 
and disbanded in the aftermath of the 2014 election. At the same time, an energetic 
and lively debate on surveillance policy at the agendas level did not translate into 
major political changes at the institutions level.  John Key’s National Party was 
elected for a third term, and the Key leadership wasted little time in announcing a 
major overhaul of the security and intelligence sector to face what it termed future 
terrorist threats facing New Zealand and the region. 
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Impact of the Surveillance Controversy at the Policy Level  
 
According to Williams’ conceptualization of public impact, the implementation of 
legislative changes offers clear indicators of the influence of developments on the 
policy level. In New Zealand, the GCSB Amendment Act was narrowly passed in 
August 2013, despite the beginning of the Snowden leaks. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that the prolonged and intense national debate and exchanges on 
surveillance in 2013-14 at the agendas and institutions levels contributed to 
government measures relating to enhanced accountability and oversight of New 
Zealand’s intelligence community. 
 
Bolstering Oversight of New Zealand’s Intelligence Agencies 
 
In April 2014, Prime Minister Key announced the appointment of lawyer Cheryl 
Gwyn as the new Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS).148  Ms Gwyn 
took up her appointment on 5 May and succeeded the outgoing Inspector-General, the 
Honourable R. Andrew McGechan QC.  In July 2014, the New Zealand government 
appointed the first ever Deputy Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Mr 
Ben Keith.149  This appointment was part of the process of strengthening the oversight 
capabilities of the Inspector-General’s office following amendments to the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996 in September 2013.  Under these 
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amendments, the Inspector-General would be supported by a newly created Advisory 
Panel consisting of three members, one of whom would be Ms Gwyn.150 
The strengthening of the IGIS’s oversight team coincided with a critical 
performance review of the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) published 
by the State Services Commission in early July 2014.  The report found that the 
national security and intelligence priorities were inadequately defined and that basic 
systems were weak and required attention. 151   The report also confirmed that, 
following Snowden’s revelations, it was difficult to determine exactly how much faith 
the public had in New Zealand intelligence agencies. 152   The report said NZIC 
objectives should include attempts to work together effectively, act within legal 
compliance and improve its public mandate.153  The latter observation may have been 
linked to a poll taken in June 2014, which showed that 71.6 per cent of New 
Zealanders believed that United States spy agencies are gathering data on them.154 
Snowden indicated that the NSA had advised the GCSB to find or create 
loopholes in New Zealand law to enable widespread spying.155  In testimony to the 
European Parliament, Snowden revealed that the NSA puts pressure on other 
countries to change laws to create legal gaps through which mass surveillance could 
be carried out.156 At the same time, Snowden’s leaks pinpointed some of the targets of 
Five Eyes’ signals intelligence collection efforts.  These included the private 
telephones of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Indonesian Prime Minister 
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the email systems of the Brazilian Ministry of Energy 
and Mining, Mexican politicians, Arab dictators, Malaysian government agencies and 
Chinese telecommunication firms. 157   Such revelations led to strong diplomatic 
protests, most notably from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said ‘spying 
amongst friends’ was ‘unacceptable’ and compared the NSA with the Stasi.158  
In February 2014, the European Parliaments Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs condemned New Zealand for its involvement in mass 
surveillance as part of the Five Eyes alliance.159  The Committee found that New 
Zealand had been involved on a large scale in mass surveillance of electronic 
communications, had actively cooperated with the US and may have exchanged with 
other members personal data of European Union (EU) citizens transferred from the 
EU.160  The Committee’s finding was that, because of the GCSB’s integration into the 
NSA spying network, the EU does not trust New Zealand laws.161  In New Zealand, 
the fallout from the Snowden revelations focused the attention of the New Zealand 
public on the role of the GCSB, the GCSB’s relationship with the NSA and the impact 
this has had on New Zealand’s political autonomy.162 
Thus, the surveillance controversy had some impact at the policy level prior to 
the general election of September 2014. The GCSB Amendment Bill was passed in 
the face of considerable domestic opposition, but this opposition – now buoyed by the 
continuing Snowden revelations - may well have been a factor in the Prime Minister’s 
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decision to enhance oversight and attempt to boost public confidence in an 
intelligence service damaged by two consecutive scandals. 
 
The Post-Election Revamp of Security and Intelligence 
 
On 6 October 2014, Mr Key announced a major overhaul of the security and 
intelligence sector. Under the new arrangements, the Prime Minister took on the new 
role of Minister for National Security and Intelligence and would retain strategic 
leadership in this sector as a whole.  At the same time, the Attorney-General, Mr 
Chris Finlayson became the Minister in Charge of the NZ Security Intelligence 
Service and Minister Responsible for the GCSB, and assumed responsibility for the 
day-to-day running of these agencies within the policy framework set by the Prime 
Minister.  In addition, Mr Key indicated he would establish and chair a new National 
Security Committee of Cabinet.163  These changes, according to the Prime Minister, 
‘will make our structure very similar to that seen in Australia and Great Britain’ and 
would help New Zealand deal with ‘threats in the ever-changing environment’.164 
Within days, the New Zealand government spelled out the sort of threat the 
country was now facing. In the wake of raids by Australian police targeting alleged 
Islamic State terrorists in Sydney and Brisbane, Mr Key said a ‘domestic beheading’ 
inspired by ISIS extremists could not be ruled out in New Zealand.165  As an upshot, 
the New Zealand government raised the country’s national threat level from very low 
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to low.  While previously the threat of a terrorist attack was deemed unlikely, it was 
now assessed as possible but not expected.166 
Mr Key’s keenly anticipated speech on New Zealand’s national security was 
delivered on 5 November 2014. He said ‘the rise of a well-resourced, globally-
focused terrorist entity’ like ISIS, which is ‘highly skilled in recruitment techniques 
utilizing social media’, was ‘a game changer for New Zealand’.167  He identified 
between 30 and 40 New Zealanders who are actively engaged in advancing the ISIS 
cause, whether in Syria, Iraq or New Zealand.  The Prime Minister also said a further 
30 to 40 people potentially had terrorist links and required further investigation.  In 
short, New Zealand no longer has ‘a benign threat environment’.168  But while the 
government would not send combat troops to directly fight ISIS, it will send ten 
military planners to explore the possibility of providing military training assistance to 
Iraqi forces, and boosted New Zealand’s humanitarian aid for Syrian and Iraqi 
refugees.  Furthermore, Key announced several domestic measures aimed at boosting 
security.  These included increasing the length of time the government could cancel a 
passport on national security grounds from one to three years; new government 
powers to temporarily suspend passports; broader NZSIS surveillance powers such as 
extending video monitoring of private property for security related activities and 
conducting warrantless surveillance for up to 48 hours; and increasing the funding of 
the NZSIS by almost NZ$7 million.169 
But a number of observers seriously questioned the appropriateness of expanding 
the surveillance powers of New Zealand’s intelligence agencies to counter the ISIS 
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terrorist challenge.  For one thing, the scale of the threat was disputed.  Javed Khan, 
Vice-President of the New Zealand Federation of Islamic Associations, was surprised 
and alarmed by the threat outlined by John Key.  He said he was aware of five to ten 
people associated with Islamic State, but not the 80 or so mentioned by the Prime 
Minister.170  Dr Paul Buchanan, a Security Consultant, said the Government would 
have to be careful about correctly identifying people leaving New Zealand to fight 
with Islamic State: ‘For example, there are members of the Syrian community who for 
family and personal reasons have chosen to go back and may well be fighting for the 
Free Syrian Army which of course is backed by the West in the fight against [Syrian 
President] Assad’.171  Human rights lawyer Michael Bott broadly agreed and argued 
the Key government’s new domestic security measures were disproportionate to the 
actual threat level to New Zealand and would erode personal freedoms: ‘If these 
people are to be monitored now then why do we have to...give the state more power to 
intrude on our lives. The changes have to be proportionate and at this stage we haven't 
seen the evidence’.172  Similarly, Dr Nigel Parsons, a Middle East specialist at Massey 
University, said it was easy to overstate the risks being posed to New Zealand by 
ISIS: ‘Once civil liberties are gone, once powers of surveillance are increased, those 
powers are typically difficult to roll back and those liberties are difficult to 
reclaim’.173 
In the aforementioned speech by John Key on New Zealand’s national security 
policy, the Prime Minister said international consultations, ‘including with our Five 
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Eyes partners…provided a base for our decision-making’. 174   Convinced that 
partnership with Five Eyes ‘has provided New Zealand with global information on 
international security and intelligence issues that we could never have achieved on our 
own’, Mr Key maintained ‘Five Eyes does not cost us our independence’ and ‘will be 
an important part of how we deal with the threat of ISIL at home and abroad’.175  But 
have the political costs of New Zealand participation in the Five Eyes alliance risen 
since the GCSB Amendment bill controversy and the Snowden revelations 
implicating the GCSB in NSA-led mass surveillance?  The answer will depend on 
how the actions of the New Zealand government are viewed over time in a fast 
globalizing world. 
 
Evaluating the Public Impact of the GCSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden 
Revelations in New Zealand  
 
Until the recent surveillance controversies, New Zealand has been able, so to speak, to 
fly under the radar and was widely seen as relatively benign in intelligence terms.  
This was probably due to an awareness of the ANZUS split in the mid-1980s and 
New Zealand’s occasional willingness to oppose US foreign policy initiatives, such as 
the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  But a combination of the GCSB 
Amendment Bill and Snowden’s leaked documents changed this situation. Above all, 
these developments made it clear that the intelligence relationship between New 
Zealand and the US (as well as those with the UK, Australia and Canada) has been 
much closer than generally realized. 
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Yet, in the short term at least, the political and diplomatic costs of the 
intelligence controversies do not appear to be have been significant for the Key 
government. By focusing on three different levels of public impact – agendas, 
institutions and policy – we have shown that an intense national debate on 
surveillance did not readily translate into major changes in the direction of 
government policy. Mr Kim Dotcom and the leader of the then Internet Party, Ms 
Laila Harré, anticipated that the ‘Moment of Truth’ event scheduled on the eve of the 
New Zealand general election, featuring the likes of Glenn Greenwald, Edward 
Snowden and Julian Assange, would crystallize domestic political concerns and 
counter the Key government’s claim, in its campaign for a Security Council seat, that 
New Zealand pursued an independent foreign policy.176 However, these expectations 
were not realized. As related, on 20 September 2014, the Key government was 
decisively re-elected for a third term. Moreover, on 16 October 2014, John Key’s 
New Zealand, competing with two much larger countries - Spain and Turkey - for two 
seats on the Security Council, resoundingly won a seat in the first ballot in New 
York.177  
So why did the lively debate on surveillance within New Zealand society fail to 
have an immediate impact at the policy level? After all, a poll conducted in early 2015 
by Amnesty International which surveyed 15,000 people in 13 countries around the 
world, including New Zealand, confirmed that New Zealand was amongst a cluster of 
countries that expressed clear opposition to domestic mass surveillance and the 
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involvement of their governments in spying on other countries. 178  Several factors 
seem to account for the apparent discrepancy. First, according to Rebecca Emery, the 
New Zealand public probably felt ‘quite powerless’179 in relation to a complex issue 
like surveillance. Blanket denials by the Key government and the unwillingness of 
David Cunliffe’s Labour party – the major opposition group in Parliament – to clearly 
challenge Key’s narrative meant that many New Zealanders tended to give the Prime 
Minister the benefit of the doubt on this issue and focused on ‘bread and butter’ 
election issues. Second, and not unrelated, the mass surveillance controversy only 
emerged in earnest in New Zealand in 2013 and the running on this new issue was 
largely made by relatively small political parties like the Greens or the Internet party  
and individuals like the German born entrepreneur Kim Dotcom, foreign journalists 
like Glenn Greenwald, and foreign whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden. In the 
circumstances, Prime Minister Key played the patriotic card by strongly implying that 
these foreign-born critics were deliberately acting against New Zealand’s national 
interests and that he had to strengthen the national security sector to keep the country 
safe from Islamist terror. 
However, the impact of the surveillance debate at the policy level could yet prove 
to be very significant for New Zealand in the long-term. The intimacy and 
accessibility of the country’s political system means that public opinion still remains 
potentially a potent factor in the shaping of policy. To date, the Key government has 
been able to maintain its domestic support in the face of the controversies generated 
by the GCSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden leaks. But such support cannot be 
regarded as a permanently operating factor. As noted, the Key government has sought 
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to ameliorate public concerns over intelligence operations by strengthening the 
oversight capabilities of the Inspector-General’s office. While this measure does not 
eliminate the problem of the Prime Minister appointing both the Directors of the 
GCSB and SIS and the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence, it has already 
begun to have consequences for the conduct of national security policy. In late 
November 2014, an inquiry headed by the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence, Cheryl Gwyn, found that the NZSIS released incomplete and misleading 
classified information in response to an Official Information Act request by blogger 
Cameron Slater.180 Mr Slater was encouraged to make this request by members of the 
Prime Minister’s staff and he used the information obtained to politically undermine 
Mr Goff’s claim that he had not been briefed by the NZSIS on Israeli intelligence 
activities in Christchurch in 2011. The Director of the NZSIS was instructed by Ms 
Gwyn to provide an unreserved apology to the former Labour leader.181  
At the same time, there remains a wide gulf between Prime Minister Key’s firm 
denial that New Zealand is involved in mass surveillance and continuing revelations 
from Edward Snowden that strongly implicate New Zealand’s intelligence agencies in 
such activity. While international opinion remains sharply divided over Snowden’s 
actions, there is little or no evidence to show that his claims about the NSA and its 
surveillance work through the Five Eyes alliance are inaccurate. In October 2014, 
documents released by Snowden seemed to show the NSA and partners like the 
GCSB have been involved in intelligence gathering activities in friendly countries 
whether in the Pacific, Europe or Asia. 182  In early March 2015, investigative 
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journalist Nicky Hager and Ryan Gallagher, a reporter for The Intercept, published 
claims, derived from leaked Snowden files, that the GCSB has dramatically expanded 
its spying operations during the John Key government at the behest of the NSA.  
The documents provided by Snowden showed that the GCSB base at Waihopai 
has moved to ‘full-take collection’ (which means that the base now collects and 
retains everything it intercepts), with much of its attention directed ‘against a 
surprising array of New Zealand's friends, trading partners and close Pacific 
neighbours. These countries' communications are supplied directly to the NSA and 
other Five Eyes agencies with little New Zealand oversight or decision-making, as a 
contribution to US worldwide surveillance’. 183  These targets include Pacific 
neighbours, such as Samoa, Vanuatu and Fiji. According to Hager and Gallagher, the 
Snowden documents indicated that counter-terrorism is at most a minor part of the 
GCSB's operations.184 Moreover, the Snowden documents contained information that 
New Zealand and America intelligence operatives were engaged in electronic spying 
on government buildings in Auckland belonging to Wellington’s largest trade partner, 
China.185 It was also reported that Snowden’s leaked information appeared to show 
that GCSB was used to spy on rivals to New Zealand Trade Minister, Tim Groser, for 
the position of Secretary General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013.186 
These revelations had some immediate reverberations. New Labour leader 
Andrew Little said he was shocked to hear about mass spying in the Pacific while 
Green Party co-leader, Russel Norman, claimed the GCSB had broken the law by 
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spying on New Zealand citizens in Pacific nations. 187  On 26 March, following a 
formal complaint by the Green Party, it was reported that the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security, Ms Cheryl Gwyn, would investigate whether the GCSB had 
illegally spied on New Zealanders working or travelling in the South Pacific. 188 
Meanwhile, reports that New Zealand had been spying on China sparked a firm 
diplomatic response. The Chinese Embassy in Wellington issued a statement, saying 
the Beijing was concerned about such reports and that it would ‘firmly safeguard our 
security interests’.189 In addition, the Brazilian government reacted angrily to reports 
that the GCSB had spied on its successful campaign to get diplomat Roberto Azevedo 
elected as Secretary General of the World Trade Organization. It demanded an 
explanation from the Key government and summoned New Zealand’s ambassador in 
Sao Paulo, Caroline Bilkey, to Brazil’s Foreign Ministry headquarters to provide 
one.190 
Such developments point to the very real prospect of a credibility gap in the 
national security policy of New Zealand. If the Key leadership continues to contribute 
to a massively increased NSA-led Five Eyes covert surveillance effort, it runs the risk 
of undermining the political and diplomatic legitimacy of the country. New Zealand 
has branded itself internationally as a small, democratic, Pacific state that has a 
diverse and independent foreign policy. But the GCSB Amendment Act and the 
Snowden revelations have undermined such claims. The Key government has 
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substantially expanded the surveillance powers of its intelligence agencies at a time 
when it acknowledges the Islamist terrorist threat to New Zealand is “low”. Moves 
towards mass surveillance by the Five Eyes alliance members has increased the scope 
for the abuse of political power in Wellington, encroached on the privacy of law-
abiding New Zealand citizens, potentially diminished the country’s capacity to target 
real terrorist suspects, and clouds New Zealand’s standing and relations with 
democratic allies in Pacific and South America and important trade partners like 
China. In short, there is a growing tension between the distinctive foreign policy aims 
and interests of New Zealand globally and its participation in a system of ubiquitous 
spying driven by the NSA within the Five Eyes Alliance.  
It would be naïve to believe that the Key government is unaware of these risks. 
But it probably believes they are manageable, and that the benefits of Five Eyes 
membership are more than offset by the enhanced surveillance demands that the NSA 
has made upon fellow ‘club’ members since 2009. According to Joe Nye (Jr), 
‘[i]nformation is the new coin of the international realm, and the United States is 
better positioned than any other country to multiply the potency of its hard and soft 
power through information’.191 Thus, the utilization of new technologies by the NSA 
for building a massively expanded surveillance system within Five Eyes is almost 
certainly linked to the geo-political goal of American primacy. However, while 
American power may explain the Key government’s co-operative stance toward the 
Five Eyes surveillance agenda, there are several developments, singularly or 
collectively, that could de-stabilize Key’s balance of advantage assessment at the 
policy level.   
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First, the cumulative impact of Snowden’s continuing release of NSA documents 
will help keep the surveillance issue alive in New Zealand, and will only increase the 
chances of mainstream political contestation. Second, there is some evidence of 
pushback in the US to NSA activities. In May 2015, the US Court of Appeals, in a 
landmark decision, ruled that the bulk collection of telephone metadata by the NSA is 
unlawful. This could pave the way for a full legal challenge against the NSA,192and 
that would certainly complicate New Zealand’s participation in NSA-led surveillance 
programs. Third, New Zealand has no real hard power of its own to achieve its global 
interests. Instead, it relies heavily on soft power and trust to support them, and is 
therefore particularly vulnerable to retaliatory measures193 from states like Brazil and 
China that could be aggrieved by New Zealand’s participation in Five Eyes spying 
operations. As a current member of the UN Security Council, with growing economic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand cannot afford to be indifferent to 
growing concerns about its espionage role.  The Key government will face growing 
domestic and international pressures to adjust its national security policy so that it is 
consistent with what is claimed to be an independent and diverse foreign policy. In 
short, it is certainly possible that New Zealand policy-making will be significantly 
affected by the unfolding controversy over surveillance in the reasonably near future. 
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